



imprisonment. See [D.E. 33]; [D.E. 34] 2. Artis did not appeal.

On June 2, 2021, Artis moved for compassionate release. See [D.E. 37]. The government opposes the motion. See [D.E. 45].

## II.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment if (1) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" or (2) "the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison," and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") has determined the defendant is not a danger to another person or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 194 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 185–86 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 383 (2021); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 275–77 (4th Cir. 2020). A section 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction must comport with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194.

Before filing a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a defendant must "fully exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This requirement is nonjurisdictional, and the government waives a defense based on section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirements if the government does not timely raise it. See United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 129–30 (4th Cir. 2021).

When considering a defendant's compassionate release motion, the court determines whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist and whether, in the court's discretion, those

circumstances warrant relief in light of relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. See Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194–95; High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 330–32. In evaluating the section 3553(a) factors, the court considers, *inter alia*, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct, the need to deter criminal behavior, the need to promote respect for the law, and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1966–68 (2018); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480–81 (2011); High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 331–32; United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 412 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 2019). Although a court considers a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct, rehabilitation alone is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.3; McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286 n.9.

No Sentencing Commission policy statement currently applies to a defendant’s compassionate release motion. See Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194; High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 330–31; McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281–82. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is a policy statement that applies to compassionate release motions filed by the BOP Director. Nonetheless, section 1B1.13 “remains helpful guidance even when motions are filed by defendants.” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282 n.7; see Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194. Application Note 1 of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 lists several extraordinary and compelling circumstances, including (A) a defendant’s serious medical condition, (B) a defendant’s age, when coupled with serious physical or mental deterioration due to age and having served 10 years or 75 percent of his or her sentence, (C) certain family circumstances in which a defendant’s minor children or incapacitated spouse or registered partner would otherwise have no caregiver, or (D) any other extraordinary and compelling reason. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). “[A]n

extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing in order to warrant” a sentence reduction. Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.2.

Artis did not apply to his warden before moving for compassionate release. See [D.E. 37] 3. On October 5, 2021, over four months after Artis moved for compassionate release, Artis requested home confinement. See [D.E. 41-1] 2. On October 7, 2021, the warden denied Artis’s request. See id. The government has invoked section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirements. See [D.E. 45] 3. Nonetheless, the court assumes that Artis met the exhaustion requirements and addresses Artis’s motion on the merits. See Muhammad, 16 F.4th at 130.

Artis seeks compassionate release pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A) and cites the COVID-19 pandemic, his medical conditions (diabetes, hypertension, and immunosuppression), his rehabilitative efforts, his release plan, and his supportive family. See [D.E. 37]; [D.E. 37-1]; [D.E. 37-2]; [D.E. 41] 4–8; [D.E. 41-2]; [D.E. 41-3]; [D.E. 41-4] 2–5.

As for the “medical condition of the defendant” policy statement, the policy statement requires that the defendant be “suffering from a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii). Artis has diabetes and hypertension and argues his medical conditions, together with his immunosuppressive medication, put him at heightened risk of serious infection from COVID-19. See [D.E.37] 4; [D.E. 37-2]; [D.E. 41] 4–7; [D.E. 41-4] 2, 4. However, on April 26, 2021, Artis refused a COVID-19 vaccine. See [D.E. 45-1]. The vaccine would provide protection. See, e.g., United States v. Scalea, No. 21-2631, 2022 WL 795425, at \*1 (3d Cir. Mar. 15, 2022) (unpublished) (noting that although “vaccination does not rule out reinfection . . . this does not diminish that vaccination mitigates the risk of COVID-19 complications”); United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th



747, 751 (6th Cir. 2021) (“And following full vaccination, it is now well understood, both the likelihood of contracting COVID-19 and the associated risks should one contract the virus are significantly reduced” so that “an inmate largely faces the same risk from COVID-19 as those who are not incarcerated.”); United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 936 n.2 (10th Cir. 2021) (noting “there is certainly room for doubt” that being fully vaccinated or being offered a vaccine “would support a finding of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’” justifying compassionate release), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2742 (2022); United States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[F]or the vast majority of prisoners, the availability of a vaccine makes it impossible to conclude that the risk of COVID-19 is an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for immediate release.”); United States v. Baeza-Vargas, 532 F. Supp. 3d 840, 843–46 (D. Ariz. 2021) (collecting cases showing the “growing consensus” of district courts that have ruled that an inmate receiving a COVID-19 vaccine “weighs against a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances”); cf. United States v. Petway, No. 21-6488, 2022 WL 168577, at \*2 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished). Artis has not disclosed to the court any religious or medical reason why he cannot receive or benefit from a COVID-19 vaccine. See Lemons, 15 F.4th at 751 (noting that “if an inmate does not present a compelling reason justifying the failure to be vaccinated despite access to the vaccine, a district court would abuse its discretion by” granting compassionate release); United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 597 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the defendant’s failure to be vaccinated was not an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying compassionate release because he “has never contended that he is medically unable to receive or benefit from the available vaccines”). “[A] prisoner who remains at elevated risk because he has declined to be vaccinated cannot plausibly characterize that risk as an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ justification for release. The risk is self-incurred.” Broadfield, 5 F.4th at 803; see also United States v. Thomas, No. 21-1645, 2022 WL 296594, at \*2 (3d Cir. Feb.

1, 2022) (unpublished); United States v. Kennedy, No. 21-2675, 2022 WL 43187, at \*2 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (unpublished); Lemons, 15 F.4th at 751 (“[A] defendant’s incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic—when the defendant has access to the COVID-19 vaccine—does not present an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ warranting a sentence reduction.”); Hald, 8 F.4th at 936 n.2 (noting “there is certainly room for doubt” that being fully vaccinated or being offered a vaccine “would support a finding of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’” justifying compassionate release); United States v. Sawyers, No. CR 15-70-RSWL-1, 2021 WL 2581412, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2021) (“The glaring consensus among district courts is that refusal of a COVID-19 vaccine subverts a defendant’s compassionate release motion.”); Baeza-Vargas, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 843–44 (collecting cases that ruled “that an inmate’s denial of a COVID-19 vaccination weighs against a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances”); United States v. McBride, No. 5:19-CR-7, 2021 WL 354129, at \*3 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 2, 2021) (noting that even if the defendant’s medical condition qualified as an extraordinary and compelling reason for granting compassionate release, “it does not qualify as such in this instance. Defendant rejected the COVID-19 vaccine. . . . Defendant’s refusal to take preventative measures undermines his assertion that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to warrant his release from prison.”); cf. United States v. Osman, No. 21-7150, 2022 WL 485183, at \*1 n.2 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished).

The wide availability of COVID-19 vaccines greatly diminishes the risk to Artis from COVID-19 whether he is in prison or not. See, e.g., Scalea, 2022 WL 795425, at \*1; Ibarra, 2022 WL 229198, at \*1; Lemons, 15 F.4th at 751; Hald, 8 F.4th at 936 n.2; Broadfield, 5 F.4th at 803; Baeza-Vargas, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 843–46. And the availability of COVID-19 vaccines allows Artis to reduce his risk should he so choose. See Thomas, 2022 WL 296594, at \*2; Kennedy, 2022 WL 43187, at \*2; Broadfield, 5 F.4th at 803. Additionally, Artis’s medical conditions are under control.

See [D.E. 37-2] 16. Therefore, reducing Artis's sentence because of his risk factors and the general risk of COVID-19 in the prison environment does not comport with application note 1(A). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

As for the "other reasons" policy statement, the court assumes without deciding that the COVID-19 pandemic, Artis's medical conditions, his rehabilitative efforts, his release plan, and his supportive family together are compelling reasons under section 3582(c)(1)(A). Cf. United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) ("[T]he mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release, especially considering BOP's statutory role, and its extensive and professional efforts to curtail the virus's spread."). However, the section 3553(a) factors counsel against reducing Artis's sentence. See Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194–95, 198–200; High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 331–32.

Artis is 43 years old and is incarcerated for being a felon in possession of a firearm. See PSR ¶¶ 1–3. Artis possessed the stolen 9mm pistol in connection with two other felony offenses, possession of cocaine and aggravated assault. See id. ¶ 11. Artis participated in at least two shootings. See id. ¶¶ 6–10. Artis discharged the 9mm stolen firearm at a club and during a dispute over a cocaine sale. See id. ¶¶ 7–8. Artis possessed four other firearms, including a firearm with a silencer and a pistol buried in an undisclosed location. See id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 11. Artis's criminal history dates back to 1998 and includes numerous drug and violent offenses. See id. ¶¶ 16–23. Artis received convictions for maintaining a vehicle, dwelling, or place for a controlled substance, resisting a public officer (two counts), selling cocaine, reckless driving to endanger, possession of drug paraphernalia, fleeing or eluding arrest with a motor vehicle, and assault on a government official or employee (two counts). See id. ¶¶ 17–23. Artis has a similarly poor record on

supervision, having twice violated his probation. See id. ¶¶ 22–23. Artis states that he wants to take courses in the BOP but had been unable to at the time of his filings due to COVID-19 lockdowns. See [D.E. 41] 8; [D.E. 41-4] 2. He has not provided the court with any other information on his post-sentencing conduct. Cf. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 480–81.


The court must balance Artis’s serious criminal conduct, his serious and violent criminal history, his history of poor performance on probation, the need to punish him, the need to promote respect for the law, the need to protect society, and the need to deter others. Cf. Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2403–04 (2022); Pepper, 562 U.S. at 480–81; High, 997 F.3d at 187–91; McDonald, 986 F.3d at 412; Martin, 916 F.3d at 398. The court also has considered Artis’s potential exposure to COVID-19, his medical conditions, his rehabilitative efforts, his release plan, and his supportive family. Artis has a release plan that includes living with his sister in North Carolina and working in lawn care. See [D.E. 37-1] 2. The court recognizes Artis has a supportive family and friends. See [D.E. 41] 8; [D.E. 41-3]. Having considered the entire record, the extensive steps that the BOP has taken to address COVID-19, the section 3553(a) factors, Artis’s arguments, the government’s persuasive response, the need to punish Artis for his serious and violent criminal behavior, to incapacitate Artis, to promote respect for the law, to deter others, and to protect society, the court denies Artis’s motion for compassionate release. See, e.g., Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2403–04; Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1966–68; High, 997 F.3d at 187–91; United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008–09 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693–94 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hill, No. 4:13-CR-28-BR, 2020 WL 205515, at \*2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2020) (unpublished), aff’d, 809 F. App’x 161 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished).

### III.

In sum, the court DENIES defendant’s motion for compassionate release [D.E. 37].



SO ORDERED. This 22 day of September, 2022.

  
JAMES C. DEVER III  
United States District Judge